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International Law and The Enlightenment:
Vattel and The 18th Century
In 1758 Emerich de Vattel published Le Droit des Gens' and
became one of the most important and controversial theorists in the
history of international legal thought. 2 It is the purpose of this paper
to examine the influence of contemporary legal theory and political
realities on Vattel; specifically to examine the effect on Vattel of the
"enlightened" natural-law theory of international law, and the ero-
sion of that theory in the 18th century by the political realities of
raison d'etat, and by the systems beyond natural law which were
offered in an attempt to regulate the anarchy which the raison d'etat
philosophy produced.
The Phenomenon of the new Philosophy:
"Enlightened" Natural Law Thought
Lord Bryce remarked that the theory of natural law "which had
been for nearly two thousand years a harmless maxim, almost a
commonplace of morality, became in the end of the eighteenth
century a mass of dynamite, which shattered an ancient monarchy
and shook the European continent." 3 Yet the natural-law philosophy
of the 18th century, which formed the basis of the American and
French Revolutions, differed sharply from the traditional natural-law
* Supervisor of International Law, Pembroke College, Cambridge University, Cam-
bridge, England. The author of this article expresses his thanks to The Hague Academy of
International Law, and the staff of The Peace Palace library for their assistance in the research
for this article.
1 The full title was Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliqui 6 la
Conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains. It was printed in Neuchatel despite the
appearance of "London" with the date.
2 See, for example, CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39 (1965) in which he suggests that the beginnings of the present age of international law
may be found in Vattel; See also C. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, THE THREE STAGES OF THE
EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 28 (1932), who accuses Vattel of treason to Grotius, but
admits the universal influence of Vattel (p.32).
3 II JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 163 (1901).
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thought of medieval scholasticism, 4 and the growth of the new
"enlightened" natural-law thought may be dated from Grotius. 5
What Grotius had begun was carried on by Samuel Pufendorf,
who was the first man to hold a chair as Professor of Natural Law and
the Law of Nations. Pufendorf's appointment to this chair at the
University of Heidelberg in 1660 was imitated by the other German
universities, so that by the first half of the 18th century almost every
German university had a chair of natural law.6
The enlightened natural-law thought spread rapidly through
Europe, especially through the Protestant countries of Sweden,
Switzerland and Holland, where it was promulgated by the efforts of
Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui and Pufendorf himself.7 The official reaction
of Catholic r6gimes was somewhat less ardent, and redolent of the
"Bon Juriconsulte, Mauvais Catholique" attitude of the Reformation
period . Yet, if the new philosophy did not receive official endorse-
ment in a Catholic country like France, it did receive great unofficial
or popular support, as the many editions of the work of the new
philosophers in that country indicate.9
So great was the reception of the enlightened natural-law philos-
ophy in Europe in the 18th century, that Rousseau could declare that
France stood alone among European nations in her hesitance to
receive it: "C'est le seul peuple de l'Europe qui ait regardd cette &tude
comme n'tant bonne A rien."' 0
The Beginnings of Enlightened
Natural Law Thought: Grotius
Grotius' natural law was extremely close to scholastic natural
law in its principles, the essential difference being procedural." The
Scholastics had seen natural law as a command of God (Voluntas)
which was promulgated by reason. The binding force of the law was
divine authority. For Grotius, the link between God as the law giver,
4 See D. M. MacKinnon's Natural Law in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATION 74 et seq. H.
Butterfield and M. Wright eds. 1966).
5 See A. P. D'ENTR9VES, NATURAL LAW, chap. 3 (1967)
, R. DERATHE, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DE SON TEMPS, 28
(1950).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 29.
9 Id. at 29-31.
1o Id. at 30
" D'ENTR VES, supra note 5 at 51.
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and man as the receiver of that law, was severed, and the reasoning
process itself (Ratio) became the cogent principle of natural law.
This methodology is the thread that unravelled the fabric of
Scholastic natural-law thought. In emphasizing his rationalistic
method, which Mr. Oakeshott would call a "technique,"' 12 Grotius
had meant to complement rather than make redundant the theological
basis of natural law. Yet, by this method, "the self-evidence of
natural law ... made the existence of God perfectly superfluous.' 13
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius set out, in 1625, a system of law
among states, based ultimately on natural law, but more directly on
custom, consent and contract.' 4 It was based ultimately on natural
law, in that man was social and sought society, municipal or global;' 5
secondly, it was demonstrable from natural law that mutual consent
imposed obligations, and those practices agreed on by states for their
mutual welfare were binding for that reason. It was based directly on
custom, consent and contract, in that the actual substance of the law
of nations was as much the subject of agreement, express or implied,
as the law of civil society. As the social contract bound within the
state, similar contracts among, the states themselves were equally
binding. 16 At this stage, except for the difference of approach,
Grotius' natural law was almost indistinguishable from that of his
Scholastic contemporaries.
In 1641 Thomas Hobbes published De Cive, in which natural law
was defined as self-preservation.' 7 Hobbes challenged the view that
there was "a real moral difference between right and wrong which all
men had a duty to obey, and by which all human institutions, the state
included, must be guided."' 18 To Hobbes there was no law among
nations, but rather a return to the savage existence men endured
before the creation of the state. States existed like so many individ-
uals, jealous, tense, and "in the state and posture of gladiators."' 19
The state was free to do what it needed to do to preserve itself, and
what there was of a natural law for Hobbes was deducible from this
principle.
12 M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 1 (1962).
13 D'ENTR VES, supra note 5, at 53.
14 1. HUGO GROTlus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS xxxi (Carnegie Edition Reprint, 1964).
15 Id. at 11.
16 Id. at 14-15.
17 THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE OR THE CITIZEN 32 (S. P. Lamprecht, ed. 1949).
18 J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 118 (1963).
19 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 101 (M. Oakeshott, ed. 1966).
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Hobbes' impact was so great that, to borrow a phrase from
Whitehead, the enlightened natural-law thought after 1640 was a
footnote to Hobbes. Much of the reaction to Hobbes took the form of
attempts to introduce benevolence and social consciousness into his
stark individualism. Two of the most prominent reactors against
Hobbes were Pufenforf and Leibnitz, 20 both of whom attempted to
create a middle ground between Grotius and Hobbes. Pufendorf
emerged more influenced by Hobbes, Leibnitz more influenced by
Grotius.
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was the foremost exponent of
the "naturalist" concept of international law;2 ' that is, he did not
recognize an international law apart from natural law, but rather as a
denomination of it, As he wrote:
... Hobbes' De Civa, chap. xiv, 4, 5, divides natural law "into the natural law of
men and the natural law of states, which is commonly called the law of nations.
The injunctions of both," he adds, "are the same; but because states upon being
constituted, take on the natural properties of men, the law which we call natural
when speaking of the duty of individual men, on being applied to whole nations
and peoples, or states, is called the law of nations." To this statement we also
fully ascribe. Nor do we feel there is any other voluntary or positive law of
nations, which has the force of law, properly so called, such as binds nations as
if it proceeded from a superior. 22
Pufendorf claimed that the trouble with Hobbes was that he was
misunderstood.2 3 In explaining how Hobbes should be interpreted,
Pufendorf in fact modified the Hobbesian philosophy. He blunted
Hobbes' selfish individualism by reintroducing and re-emphasizing
the social nature of man. He defined man's social tendencies as being
as basic to man as self-preservation, and the complement of the
individual's drive to survive:
... It is easy to find the basis of natural law. It is quite clear that man is an
animal extremely desirous of his own preservation, in himself exposed to want,
unable to exist without the help of his fellow creatures, fitted in a remarkable
way to contribute to the common good, and yet at all times malicious, petulant,
and easily irritated, as well as quick and powerful to do injury. For such an
animal to live and enjoy the good things that attend his condition, it is necessary
that he be sociable, that is, be willing to join himself in such a way that far from
20 GOUGH, supra note 18 at 119.
21 A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 147 (1962). See also,
H. WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1843).
22 Bk I, Vol. II, SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, LIBRI OCTO
226, (Carnegie Edition Reprint, 1964).
23 Id. at 210-211.
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having cause to do him harm, they may feel there is reason to preserve and
increase his good fortune .... And so it will be a fundamental law of nature, that
every man so far as in him lies, should cultivate and preserve towards others a
sociable attitude which is peaceful and agreeable at all times to the nature and
end of the human race .... But by a sociable attitude we mean an attitude of
each man towards every other man, by which each is understood to be bound to
the other by kindness, peace, and love, and therefore mutual obligation.
24
The importance of Pufendorf in the history of international legal
theory was that he was fully aware of the gulf yawning between the
Scholastic and the new natural-law thought; and he attempted to
create a Summa Theologica of the enlightened natural law. In it,
while retaining the rationalistic method, he tried to rescue natural-law
thought from the reductio ad absurdum of Hobbes and to create
social duties where Hobbes had only selfish rights. The Scholastic
natural law had had those duties as part of divine law. The en-
lightened natural law needed a new rationalistic framework in which
to balance individual rights and social duties, and Pufendorf tendered
to that need.
His direct treatment of international law as a "denomination" of
natural law was a failure in that he could not accommodate the law of
treaties or customary law to such a system, and any system which
pretended to ignore them was doomed. 25 Yet, in applying his system
of individual rights and social duties on an international plane, he
made a significant contribution. "Since sovereigns are related to one
another as individuals in the state of nature, the rules of natural law
are basically the same for the conduct of individuals and sover-
eigns," 26 and by this method Pufendorf translated Hobbes' notion of
equality based on strength or cunning into a legal equality, that is,
".* whatever law a man appeals to against another, he must under
every circumstance admit against himself," 27 and applied it to nations
among themselves.
Besides Pufendorf, another great reactor to Hobbes was Gott-
fried Leibnitz (1646-1716), who, like Pufendorf, strove to reconcile
the selfish tendencies of mankind and the need for order, within a
rationalistic system. If Pufendorf sought the answer by proceeding
outwardly from individual requirements to social requirements, Leib-
24 Id. at 207-208.
25 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 21 at 147.
26 LEONARD KRIEGER, THE POLITICS OF DISCRETION 165-166 (1965).
27 PUFENDORF, supra note 22 at 332.
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nitz reversed the process, and thought first in terms of the society,
then of its members. His "practical" solutions to international
problems were hopelessly out of date. He saw the political salvation
of Europe in federation, in a kind of revitalized Holy Roman Empire,
under the sway of a single ruler. 28 While this kind of solution might
have been appropriate within Leibnitz' Germany, which was the most
politically disorganized country in Europe at that time, it completely
ignored the realities of the contemporary European state system.
Like St. Pierre's Perpetual Peace of a few years later, Leibnitz' plan
lacked only "the consent of Europe and a few similar trifles."'29
The importance of Leibnitz' influence would be in the translation
of his philosophic thought into general laws 30 which would have
relevance to relations of states. Leibnitz' ideas, as expressed in his
Monadology, which R. W. Meyer interpreted as a political allegory of
self-interest and universal harmony, 3' would very much color the
thinking of future theorists such as Wolff and Vattel. The problem of
individual freedom and universal harmony in a world in which
everything is linked with everything else, was as much a fact of
European political life as of Leibnitz' organisms. Leibnitz' success in
solving this problem32 is not so important to international legal
thought as is the effect his conclusions had on the juriconsults. If one
changes the meaning of "free beings" in Carr's commentary on
Leibnitz from monads to states, one can get some idea of the potential
impact of Leibnitz on international legal thought:
Granted the creation of such free beings [monads], what will be the nature of
their freedom? Their freedom will depend on the range of their activity, and it
will differ in degree and consequently in character proportionate to the range of
such activity. In itself each such nature will consist in a living force ready to find
expression when the occasion arises. A universe of such beings will be a
universe of free forces mutually limiting one another, and also mutually
providing one another the scope for action. 33
Christian Wolff (1676-1756) was Professor of the Law of Nature
and of Nations at the University of Halle, and the man who
28 See F. H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 30 (1963).
29 Id. at 45.
30 W. H. BARBER, LEIBNITZ IN FRANCE 125 (1955).
31 R. W. MEYER, LEIBNITZ AND THE 17TH CENTURY REVOLUTION 166 (J. P. Stern,
trans. 1952).
32 See JAMES COLLINS, A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY 302-303
(1954).
33 H. W. CARR, LEIBNITZ 74 (1930). Emphasis added.
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systemize Leibnitz. 34 If Pufendorf's work represented the edifice of
international legal theory as it stood in 1740, Wolff was the artisan
who, under the influence of Leibnitz' philosophy, would remodel and
extend it.
Wolff could agree that Pufendorf was correct in asserting that
inasmuch as states were moral persons, they were bound by natural
law, yet he was unwilling to agree that the principles of the law of
nature applied to individuals were the same as the law of nature
affecting states (the law of nations).
Since indeed nations are moral persons and ... subject only to certain rights
and duties, which by virtue of the law of nature arise from the social
contract .. the law of nations does not remain the same in all respects as the
law of nature in so far as it controls the acts of individuals.a 5
Furthermore, in opposition to Pufendorf, Wolff asserted that
there was an international positive law which he, like Grotius, called
the Voluntary Law of Nations. He argued that there existed in
international society a "supreme state"3 6 which corresponded to the
formation of society on the individual level. The supreme state was
formed by nature herself, and from the purpose for which that
supreme state was formed can be deduced the laws governing that
state. The laws so deduced form the Voluntary Law of Nations.
Thus, for Wolff, each nation was bound by the principles of
natural law, just as each individual person, but with this difference: A
person was bound by virtue of his existence as an individual, a state
by virtue of social contract. Thus, both would have, for example the
right to self-defense; but what constitutes a lawful exercise of that
right would differ between an individual and a state, and in this way,
the natural law for individuals would differ from the natural law of
states (the law of nations).
In addition, each nation was bound by the Voluntary Law of
Nations just as an individual in society was bound by civil law. The
Voluntary Law of Nations did not remove the original obligation of
the natural law, but rather dealt with what may be enforced. In civil
law, a statute of limitation may bar a claim, but it cannot destroy the
moral obligation to pay just debts. So too did the Voluntary Law of
34 See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM XXX,
note 2 (Carnegie Edition Reprint, 1964).
35 Id. at 5.
36 Id. at 13.
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Nations operate, affecting only externals, and leaving the original
natural law obligations unimpaired.
In this way, Wolff sought to solve the problem with which
Pufendorf struggled. Pufendorf's idea that only natural law bound
nations, could not satisfactorily explain a system of regulation
beyond natural law, and Pufendorf was put in the uncomfortable
position of recognizing the existence of such a system but denying it
legal status. Through the use of the Voluntary Law of Nations as
defined by himself, Wolff was able to incorporate into a system of law
both the natural law, and that regulation of states which existed
outside natural law.37
Wolff brought international legal theory forward, in that he
reintroduced international law as a discipline existing separately from
natural law. Yet his single flaw was that of Leibnitz, in a bit more
sophisticated form. Wolff was unable to free himself from thinking in
terms of an imperial solution to the problem of European disorder. If
this kind of thinking was out of date at the beginning of the 18th
century, it was ridiculous in the "political maelstrom" of the mid-i 8th
century.
This development from Grotius to Wolff reflected the thinking of
those who saw natural law as the central point of international legal
theory. Toward the middle of the 18th century two factors greatly
hindered the acceptance of these points of view. The first was the
political anarchy of Europe, in which, under the name of raison
d'tat, force rather than law was the method of settling controversies.
The second factor, which was a reaction of the first, was the growing
outcry for a form of regulation beyond natural law, whether utopian
federation or universal education, to deal with the excesses of a
European state system which behaved so barbarously.
The Political Maelstrom of
the 18th Century
The climate of international relations in the 18th century is
stated bluntly by Baron Bielfeld: "In matters of politics one must not
be deceived by speculative ideas which the common people form of
justice, equity, moderation, candor, and the other virtues of nations
and their leaders. In the end everything is reduced to force."'38
37 Id. at 9-19.
38 ALBERT SOREL, EUROPE UNDER THE OLD REGIME 17 (F. H. Herrick, trans. 1947).
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Many of the ideas found in the writings of the juriconsults
seemed belied by events:
To see on the other hand the perpetual dissensions, the brigandage, the
usurpations, the rebellions, the wars, the murders which daily distress this
venerable abode of sages, this respectable sanctuary of science and art, and to
think of our fine talk and then of our horrible actions, so much humanity in
principle, so much cruelty in deed, a religion so gentle and an intolerance so
blood-thirsty, a political system so wise on paper, so harsh in practice, rules so
benevolent and people so miserable, governments so moderate and wars so
cruel, one hardly knows how to make these strange contradictions agree; and
this pretended brotherhood of the nations of Europe seems nothing but a term of
derision to express ironically their mutual animosity.3 9
For Voltaire, "the right of the strongest equates foreign policy to
the uninhibited man of force", 40 and diplomacy is "the art of lying at
the right time."'4 1 Diderot summarized the views of the philosophers
on the diplomacy of their times in his "Political Principles of Rulers":
"Make alliances only in order to sow hatred .... Incite wars among
my neighbors and try to keep them going. . . . Have no ambassadors
in other countries, but spies. . . . To be neutral means to profit from
the difficulties of others in order to improve one's situation. '4 2
Montesquieu, in Letter 84 of The Persian Letters, uses irony to
emphasize his feelings about war:
Je fus hier aux Invalides; j'aimerais autant avoir fait cet tablissement, si j'6tais
prince, que d'avoir gagn6 trois batailles. On y trouve partout la main d'un grand
monarque. Je crois que c'est le lieu le plus respectable de la terra.
Quel spectacle, de voir assembldes dans une meme place toutes les victimes
de la Patrie, qui ne respirent que la d6fendre, et qui, se sentant le meme coeur. et
non pas la mme force, ne se plaignent que de l'impuissance ob eles sont de se
sacrificier encore pour elle!
Quoi de plus admirable, que de voir ces guerriers ddbiles, dans cette retraite,
observer une discipline aussi exacte que s'il y &taient constraints par la pre'sence
d'un ennemi, chercher leur derni~re satisfaction dans cette image de la guerre, et
partager leur coeur et Leur esprit entre les devoirs de la religion et ceux de l'art
militaire .....
In Letter 94, Montesquieu outlines some of the shortcomings of
the relations of states, as typical of the ancien regime:
39 Quoted in E. M. Nuttall, SAINT PIERRE: A PROJECT FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 19 (1927).
40 M. L. Perkins, Voltaire's Concept of International Order in STUDIES IN VOLTAIRE
AND THE 18TH CENTURY 1296 (1963).
41 Id.
42 FELIX GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS 61 (1961).
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Le droit public est plus connu en Europe qu'en Asie: cependant on peut dire que
les passions des princes, la patience des peuples, ia flatterie des 6crivains, en ont
corrompu tous les principes. Ce droit, tel qu'il est aujourd'hui, est une science
qui apprend aux princes jusqu'a quel point its peuvent violer la justice, sans
choquer leurs intdrdts.
Sorel is echoing Rousseau when he states that "the Europe of the
ancien rigime observed certain practices, to which attention should
be paid, rather than to international law which reformers proposed as
an ideal for future society."' 43 From 1740, Europe was characterized
as "an armed camp", which led to the arms race Montesquieu called
"the new malady which has spread all over Europe." If raison d'etat
was not something peculiar to the 18th century, the brashness with
which it was used led Sorel to comment that "never before had the
reason of state been opposed more impudently to the most elemen-
tary concepts of honor and justice." 44 The attitude is exemplified in
the anecdote about Philosopher King Frederick's taking of Silesia on
the basis of ancient rights over the province. He was informed by
Podewils that these rights had been given up by solemn treaty and
replied: "Legal distinctions are the business of ministers; that is your
affair. The time has come to work on it secretly, for orders to the
troops have already been given." 45
The sovereignty of the individual state, and the maintenance of
that sovereignty, were basic and did not require argument: "The state
embodied its own ends. It was sovereign; it recognized no authority
above its own"; 46 and when it needed direction and a standard of
judgment, "the state could find it nowhere but in itself."47 Baron
Bielfeld gave an indication of the strength of this belief when he
wrote that the great principle of all human action, not only to
preserve existence but to render it as good as possible, is at the base
of politics:
Chaque socie'te, chaque e'tat, peut et doit m8me se servir de tous les moyens
l6gitimes qui lui paroissent necessaires, soit a sa conservation, soit a l'augmenta-
tion de sa puissance rdeles et relative. Cette regle dictde par loi naturelle aussi
bien que par la politique, sert de fondement de toutes les operations des
differents cabinets de lEurope, au systlme chaqun d'eux embrasse, aux
mesures qu'il prend, aux alliances qu'il contacte, "a la guerre qu'il declare, ou la
paix qu'il conclit.48
43 SOREL, supra note 38 at 4.
44 Id. at 17.
45 Id. at 28. See also VAN VOLLENHOVEN, supra note 2 at 34.
46 SOREL, supra note 38 at 9.
47 Id.
48 II JACOB BIELFELD, INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 138-139 (1768).
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In addition, he stated that "in whatever situation a state may find
itself, the fundamental principle of the reason of state is ever the
same. This principle, adopted by all ancient and modern peoples, is
that the safety of the people should ever be the supreme law." 49
Voltaire expressed the same view when he wrote that "survival
was the state's ultimate object." 50 And survival for Voltaire meant
nothing less than independence: "Sovereignty and dependence
•.. are a contradiction in terms." 51
Again, writing in 1769, Voltaire declared that no republican
assembly or monarch can have one other than God as master.52
In such a maelstrom, to use Frederick the Great's term, there
was no international law generally recognized. What there were of
principles grew mainly "in the light of the rules adopted by the major
powers in their negotiated treaties of peace or through prize courts or
other institutions set up to determine international legal relation-
ships."' 53 There was no one system of law universally recognized, but
there were laws which each power was ready to uphold. "They were
a confusion of feudal customs complicated with all the subtleties of
Roman jurisprudence." 54 But nothing was sacred, no principle invio-
lable, as the Pragmatic Sanction and the War of the Austrian
Succession illustrate. Not even the most explicit treaty arrangements
were honored.
The balance of power, which was the nominal system existing, or
alleged to exist, between states, had for its most basic purpose the
maintenance of independent states, 55 but it was itself subject to the
same caprice it was meant to off set.56
The Moralists: The Augmenters of Natural Law
If the methods of the ancien rigime were so disastrous what was
the alternative? One answer, reflecting the optimism of many philoso-
phers, was that the future relationships of states would be governed
by moral laws and reason. "The picture which the philosophers
envisaged of the relations among nations after the rule of reason had
49 Quoted in SOREL, supra note 38 at 11.
50 PERKINS, supra note 40 at 1300.
51 Id. at 1301.
52 Id.
53 1 JACOB BIELFELD, ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL ERUDITION I 11.
54 SOREL, supra note 38 at 27.
55 EDWARD GULICK, EUROPE'S CLASSICAL BALANCE OF POWER 23 (1955).
56 SOREL, supra note 38 at 24.
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been established, was implied in their criticism of the existing foreign
policy; the former would be the reverse of the latter. Foreign policy
should follow moral laws. There should be no difference between
'moral principles' which rule the relations among individuals and
'moral principles' which rule the relations among states."' 57
Another method was to think of a world federation. This was not
new. There had been Penn's Essay Towards the Present and Future
Peace of Europe (1693), and Abbe St. Pierre's Perpetual Peace
(1710).58 Mably, whose disgust with the wanton practices of diplo-
macy drove him to history, wrote of a "future f~d~ration euro-
p~ene. ' '59 Rousseau himself was very much taken with the idea of a
European federation: "Realiser la r6publique europ6ene un seul jour,
c'est assez pour la faire durer 6ternellement."60
Rousseau is between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand he
realized that only the most rigid confederation could achieve the
desired end of world order and an end to war, and on the other that no
such federation could ever be established.6 1 So long as the particular
wills of the individual states were not sublimated in such a way as to
eliminate the international system altogether, it was true, but irrele-
vant, that a state of war was a consequence of man's irrationality and
imperfection. Capricious acts were the immediate causes of war, but
in the international system it was necessary, not accidental, that such
acts should occur.6 2
He was moralist enough to want a confederation to give law and
order to Europe where "the public law has not been established or
sanctioned by concerted action and ... has no general principles,
and varies constantly according to times and circumstances
... abounds in contradictory rules which can be reconciled only by
right of the stronger."'63 On the other side of the coin, he was critical
enough to recognize that "the reason of state directed all policy, and
state interest was the only guarantee of any engagements. '6 4 This
kind of pessimism is a bit startling in a germinal thinker such as
Rousseau, but on reflection is quite consistent and candid, and
57 GILBERT, supra note 42 at 65.
58 HINSLEY, supra note 28 at 33.
59 JACQUES HooD, L'IDE DE FEDERATION INTERNATIONAL 136 et seq. (1921).
60 Id.
61 See HINSLEY, supra note 28 at 46 et seq. for discussion of various peace plans.
62 Id. at 52.
63 Quoted in NUTTALL, supra note 39 at 23.
64 SOREL, sutpra note 38 at 16.
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possibly not so radically different from the more practical views of
Voltaire.
Rousseau had maintained that the Law of Nations was the
product of consent, 65 express or tacit, and at the same time stressed
the natural goodness of man.6 6 As individual man has progressed on
the basis of his freedom and desire for perfection,6 7 so, too, may
states on the same basis. "La nature humaine ne retrograde pas" 68
was perhaps not so different from Voltaire's belief that the ultimate
solution to international problems lay in the education of the nations'
populaces in "the authentic image of human nature".6 9
Those who held to the need of a federation were regarded as
utopians, and did not have a great following in these beliefs. Voltaire
attacked St. Pierre and Rousseau almost as savagely as he attacked
the makers of war. 70 The physiocrats submitted that international
salvation lay in free trade, and in this way sought to point the way to a
practical solution to the international crises.71 Others were less
dogmatic about the solutions, but offered general guidelines. These
guidelines would usually be expressed in terms outside the law of
nations as then understood, because the law of nations was generally
viewed as feckless.Were it not feckless, the exercise would be futile.
But what was to be suggested would be a theory of relationships
which, if accepted, would become the basis of legal relationships, and
hence of a new law of nations.
The thinkers of the Enlightenment agreed that there were laws
which would successfully guide the relationships of states. The
physiocrats thought that a proper knowledge of economic principles
was the answer, because politics and economics were identical on the
international level. 72 Somewhat similarly, Voltaire emerges behind
the vast mountain of negative comments, to champion a freedom of
natural instincts as the basis of an improved, if not perfect, interna-
tional order.73
There are natural drives of amour propre in states as in men, and
65 DERATHI, supra note 6 at 396-397.
66 ERNST CASSIRER, THE QUESTION OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 104 (1954).
67 Id. at 105.
68 Id.
69 PERKINS, supra note 40 at 1304.
70 HODS, supra note 59 at 136 et seq.
71 GILBERT, supra note 42 at 21.
72 Id. at 62-64.
73 PFRKI's. ri'a note 40 at 1299.
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concomitant with them are the restraining forces of bien-veillance, or
forebearance. They are concomitant with amour propre because it is
only on the basis of forebearance that one's own rights will be
respected. In an enlightened state, a knowledge of these natural
drives "reverses the state's aims as the meaning of sovereignty shifts
from ego, right of the strongest, and raison d'tat, to a fourth
definition, legitimate defense or preservation of a nation's inde-
pendence." 74 Thus it is the education of the nation's populations to
these truths which will bring about their realization in international
relations.
Voltaire believed the lawyers were as useless as those who
favored world government. It was not that they lacked a desirable
end, but the means were naive. To attempt to have a world federation
or to impose laws from without was to build a house of cards. It was
bad pathology. It treated the symptom as the cause. 75
War was a fleau contradictoire avec la nature humaine,76 but
nonetheless as old as man. The solution had to be realistic, but it
could be sanguine. It had to cope with undeniable evils, and strive to
educate in order to make the best of conditions. This is the meaning
of the last line of Candide: "Ce la est bien dit, mais il faut cultiver
n6tre jardin." It is in this sense that he wrote: "La paix ne subsistera
pas plus 6ntre les princes qu'entre les elephants et les rhinoceros,
6ntre les loups et les chiens; les animaux carnassiers se dechirent
toujours 'a la premidre occasion." 77 (Hode, p. 17 HN) In such a world,
the best means of dealing is to use these forces against one another:
"Car les chiens d'6gale force se montrent les dents et ne se d6chirent
que lorsqu'ils ont 'a se disputer une proie."78
Grotius' and Pufendorf's treatises, he said, "never contributed
anything to the composition of treaties and to safeguarding the rights
of men."79 Anyone who listened to them (Grotius and Pufendorf)
would not keep his kingdom long, because the law of nations is totally
unrelated to the practice of states, where the only rule is to be
continually on the qui vive, "a truth all kings and statesmen know."80
'Vattel was dismissed as a "poor imitator."81
74 Id. at 1300.
75 Id. at 1304.
76 HOD9, supra note 59.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 PERKINS, supra note 40 at 1292.
80 Id. at 1292-1293.
8' PETER GAY, VOLTAIRE'S POLITICS 34, note 5 (1965).
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In a more satirical mood he wrote: "Le droit de la paix, je le
connais assez. C'est de tenir sa parole et de laisser tous les hommes
jouir les droits de nature; mais, pour le droit de la guerre, je ne sais
que c'est. Le Code de meurtre me semble une etrange imagination.
j'espere que bientot on nous donnera la jurisprudence des voleurs de
la grand chemin."R But one may observe that despite Voltaire's
constant denunciation of abuses, his condemnation of the past in the
name of reason and tolerance, recognizes the reality of progress.8 3
Montesquieu wrote that "all countries have a law of nations, not
excepting the Iroquois themselves, though they devour their pris-
oners: for they send and receive ambassadors, and understand the
rights of war and peace. The mischief is that their law of nations is
not founded on true principles.8 4
Esprit des Lois begins by stating: "Laws, in their most general
signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of
things." And although, as Mr. Shackleton points out, Montesquieu's
natural law is not a law in the sense in which that term has been used
by the jurists, it is significant that he introduces his "descriptive"
natural law in the traditional terminology: "The laws of the first list
are in no cases laws in the sense in which that term has been seen to
be used by the jurists. Montesquieu does not say that a man has an
obligation to feed himself, but that man does in fact feed himself. He
does not say that man ought to believe in God, that he ought to be
born free, that he ought to be reasonable, but that man does, rightly or
wrongly believe in God, that he is born free, that he is in fact
reasonable. These laws are not normative. They are descriptive of
man's condition. They express no prescriptions, and they are alien to
the ordinary conceptions of jurisprudence. They are not natural laws
in the sense known to Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, or Domat."85
In this same way, Montesquieu's law of nations sought to derive
order by recognizing that states like persons do have certain char-
acteristics, rightly or wrongly, and the best method of ordering states
was by appealing to these basic and universal characteristics.
Montesquieu's law of nations is founded on two principles: "That
different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good
they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without
82 HODt, supra note 59.
3 J. H. BRUMFITT, VOLTAIRE HISTORIAN 127 (1958).
84 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. I, ch. 3.
85 ROBERT SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU 251 (1961).
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prejudicing their real interests." Secondly: "The object of war is
victory; that of victory conquest, and that of conquest preserva-
tion."8 6
The first principle was a rule of practical experience. It is not in a
state's interest to be uncooperative in peace and bloodthirsty in war
because history has shown that kind of state conduct to be unprof-
itable.
The second principle deals with the most observable character-
istic of the Realpolitik of 18th century Europe, the desire for
aggrandizement. As Catherine II said, "Who gains nothing, loses."'87
What Montesquieu attempted to do was to show that this system
itself had built-in limits, and it was not in the interests of states to
exceed them. It was not ethical reasoning, but practical reasoning,
like Machiavelli's advice that a prince should hurt no one, except
mortally. Any other approach simply did not pay.
In the second principle, Montesquieu was simply giving expres-
sion to the principle which motivated France's policy over Alsace,
Roussillon, Flanders and Franche Comte: "There was then a natural
limit of conquest-the power of assimilation. Nothing should be
conquered which could not be kept, and nothing should be kept which
could not be absorbed." 88 And so, the proscriptions against conquest
were not legal, but common sense, because only by appealing to
states' interests could they be effected.
The Cultural but Non-Political Unity
of Europe: The Unity within Diversity
It is an historical irony that during the same period during which
nations were rending themselves asunder in Europe, a new spirit was
abroad which stressed the unity of Europe: "If the spectacle of
practical politics must make one sigh 'There was no Europe,' an
examination of the intellectual life will on the contrary evoke a clear
picture of European homogeneousness." 8 9 As the late Professor Van
Geyl pointed out, it was in terms of the "practical politics" that the
movement was new. It was new against the Balkanization of Europe
since the 17th century, "when the movement away from universality
86 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 84.
87 SOREL, supra note 38 at 11.
88 Id. at 23.
89 PIETER VAN GEYL, ENCOUNTERS IN HISTORY 374 (1967).
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(could) be observed most strikingly," 90 and whence may be traced the
machtstaat principle in which a state's actions are justified by the
state's needs.
"Some of the most eminent writers of the age, Montesquieu,
Voltaire, Hume, and later in the century, Gibbon, set themselves to
produce history of a new kind, which would illustrate, in terms of
human society, the kind of complex interdependence that biologists
were discovering in the animal world. Montesquieu's tout est estre-
mement li summarized the attitude of an age." 91 And the idea of an
interdependence was no less strong on the international level.
Rousseau described the community of Europe as a "real society
which has its religion, its manners, its customs, and even its laws
from which none of the people who compose it can withdraw without
at once causing trouble."'92 For Montesquieu, Europe is "solidaire":
"Les choses sont telles en Europe que tous les 6tats dependent les
uns des autres. La France a besoin de l'opulence de la Pologne et de
la Moscovie, comme la Guyenne a besoin de la Bretagne et de
l'Anjou. L'Europe est un itat composd de plusieurs provinces."93
The Encyclopidie, under "L'Europe" agree substantially with
Montesquieu. Voltaire saw Europe as a "kind of great republic,
embracing several states, some monarchical, some not, the former
aristocratic, the others democratic, but all in relationship to one
another, all having one and the same religious basis, the same
principles of public law, the same political ideas, all of them unknown
in other parts of the world."' 94 Europe was viewed as "ein bewunders-
wurtiges Ganze, a marvellous whole," 95 and it was so, not on the basis
of a single country or race, but by virtue of all the peoples and all the
countries of Europe. 96
The vogue of travel thrived and encouraged this spirit of unity,
as well as the avalanche of literary exchanges and translations.9 7
Edmund Burke wrote that
90 Id. at 371.
91 NORMAN HAMPSON, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 108 (1968).
92 Quoted in NUTTALL, supra note 39 at 19.
93 Quoted in HODE, supra note 59.
94 PAUL HAZARD, EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE 18TH CENTURY 463 (J. L. May, trans.,
1965).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 465-472.
97 Id. at 465-472.
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"nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence
in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of
treaties in themselves .... The secret, unseen, but irrefragible bond of habitual
intercourse hold them together .... At bottom these laws are all the same.
. It is virtually one great state, having the same basis of general law, with some
diversity of provincial customs and local establishments .... The whole of the
polity and economy of every country of Europe has been derived from the same
sources .. ."98
Burke concluded that there was such a closeness in the very conduct
of European life that "no European can be a complete exile in any
part of Europe." 99
In fine, there was a recognition of a cultural unity in Europe, and
the need for political cooperation. "There was a concordance of
views and aspirations arising naturally from each nation's particular,
as well as universal, European development. The intellectuals of the
period were aware of this. Each might feel warmly for his own
country and at moments of international tension side with it unhesi-
tatingly, yet each knew that Europe constituted a cultural unity."' 100
At the same time, there was a very acute recognition of the
political realities of Europe, and this kind of thinking must be seen
against the background of lawlessness and war on the international
level, and the most basic fact of international existence, the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of the state.
Indeed, Montesquieu went even a little too far when he
described Europe as one state composed of several provinces.
Montesquieu himself realized the true state of affairs, and wrote of it
in less hyperbolic terms elsewhere. For example, he wrote that
although the peoples of the world were "les habitants d'une grande
plan~te, cependant il est impossible de les soumettre aux lois qui
r6gissent les individus A l'intdrieur de l'6tat,"'' 1 he said elsewhere
that "what all the countries of Europe have in common is a spirit of
liberty, which has always made it difficult for them to submit to alien
power."' 0 2 These two elements of political freedom and interdepen-
dence are best demonstrated for Montesquieu in the balance of
power: "Rechercher la ruine de l'6tat voisin est un mauvais calcul,
c'est rechercher sa propre ruine, car l'Europe est solidaire."'10 3
98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE 102-103 (L. Bredvold & R. G. Ross, ed. 1960).
99 Quoted in D. HAY, EUROPE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN IDEA 123 (1957).
100 VAN GEYL, supra note 89 at 375.
101 HODt, supra note 59.
102 VAN GEYL, supra note 89 at 377.
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Rousseau despaired that such a compelling reason for harmony
in Europe should be accompanied by such bloodshed and strife:
"One hardly knows how to make these strange contradictions agree;
and this brotherhood of the nations of Europe seems nothing but a
term of derision to express ironically their mutual animosity.' 10 4
Voltaire saw survival as the ultimate objects of the states
composing his great republic, by which he meant nothing less than
independence:10 5 "No republican assembly or monarch can have
anyone but God for Master,"'1 6 and the states of Europe were "above
all ... at one in the wise policy of maintenance among themselves as
far as possible, an equal balance of power."' 1 7 In 1760, Burke, like
Voltaire, was convinced that the balance of power had long operated
"to preserve the liberty of Europe's states, if not to keep peace
between them."'1 8 By 1769, Baron Bielfeld could write: "Les
intdrets divers qui partagent les puissances de l'Europe en vertu de ce
syst~me, ont donn6 place 'a un sixi~me, qui est le maintien de la
balance de la purvoir en Europe."' 10 9
Shortly thereafter Gibbon wrote: "The division of Europe into a
number of independent states, connected however, with each other
by the general resemblance of religion, language and manners, is
productive of the most beneficial consequences to the liberty of
mankind. The cities of ancient Greece were cast in the happy mixture
of union and independence, which is repeated on a larger scale, but in
a looser form, by the nations of modern Europe: the union of religion,
language and manners, which renders them spectators and judges of
each others' merit; the independence of government and interest,
which asserts their separate freedom, and excites them to strive for
pre-eminence in the career of glory." 110
Thus, the Europe of the mid-eighteenth century was, to borrow
from Von Ranke, "a unity in diversity.""' It was distinctly not the
Europe Wolff described.
104 Quoted in NUTTALL, supra note 39 at 19.
105 PERKINS, supra note 40 at 1301.
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107 HINSLEY, supra note 28 at 163.
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Conclusion:
To summarize, in the words of Gierke:
The problem of the extent, and the nature, of international society still
continued to be met by a variety of solutions. If the state of nature were
conceived as an absolutely non-social state; and again, if international law were
regarded simply as the law of nature, still prevailing between states because they
were persones morales who still continued to remain in a state of liberty and of
equality-then the logical result was a total rejection of any idea of a general
'society of states.' For a time it appeared as if, owing to the prestige of
Pufendorf, a view of this sort would actually hold the field. In the long run
however, the opposite theory triumphed. Assuming [not an original social
condition but] an original community of all mankind, thinkers argued that the
state of nature which continued to prevail among states must necessarily be a
state of natural society. Even when they made the solitary individual their
starting point, they still could obtain the same result. They could proceed to add,
to their postulate of the solitary individual, the idea that the creation of a social
condition was nonetheless to be regarded as a state in the development of
natural law, and they could then argue that natural law in the course of its
development, dictated, or at any rate postulated, a society of nations. With this
conclusion there generally went hand in hand the recognition of a body of
positive international law, which was held to be due to a further development of
the 'natural' international law among the society of nations through the process
of express or tacit consent. The conception of a universal society of states was
successfully vindicated by Meviius, by Leibnitz, and by other opponents of the
theory of Pufendorf; it was also maintained by Thomasius, and it was finally
restored in its integrity by Wolff and his successors. 112
To one aware of this development, as Vattel certainly was, there
was a very great need to synthesize the predominant elements of
previous systems, i.e. the natural liberty of states and the natural
society of nations. Moreover, the lawlessness of the times empha-
sized the need of some system which would evoke order from the
chaos of power politics, and at the same time recognize the liberty of
states. Vattel responded to this need by publishing his Droit des Gens
in 1758.113 In it, he stressed the natural law basis of international law
more than anyone except Pufendorf, and the liberty of nations as part
of that system more than anyone except Wolff. This formula resulted
in the most important international legal text for the next hundred
years, and the basis of much of the public international law of the
20th century." 14
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195-196 (E. Barker, trans., 1960).
113 For more on the substance of VATTEL'S DROIT DES GENS, see RUDDY, TEXAS
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